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PUBLIC LANDS
Absentee Shawnee Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v. Kansas, 862 F.2d 1415
The Shawnee Tribe of Indians (Indians) in Oklahoma sought pos-
session and title to land located in Kansas which previously belonged to
the Indians, but was granted to a charitable society in an 1854 treaty
with the United States government. Eleven years later, the United
States patented the land to a deceased individual and the Indians chal-
lenged in district court the validity of this patent, since under common
law, patents to deceased individuals are void. The lower court found the
patent valid under a statute effective at the time of the patent that made
patents to deceased persons valid and vesting in the deceased's heirs,
devisees, and assigns, so long as the patent was for "public land." The
Indians appealed to the Tenth Circuit, asserting that the statute was in-
applicable because the land was Indian land and not public land.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding the land public. The court be-
gan by looking to the treaty between the tribe and the U.S. government
and held that it must be treated like a contract. In the treaty, the court
first found the subject property was sold in consideration for $10,000.
Since the Supreme Court of the United States had held previously that
"public lands" are those "subject to sale . . . under general laws," this
land qualifies as public land and substantiates the patent under the stat-
ute. Second, the court found that in the treaty the Indians agreed to
recede to the United States to hold title to all property which may be
sold. Because the government held title to this land, it was deemed
"public." Third, the court held that "unclaimed lands," not taken by
the Indians among the land made available to them is public, since such
land is subject to sale. Since the subject property was never claimed by
any members of the tribe, it is unclaimed. Consequently, it is subject to
sale, which makes it qualify as "public land."
United States v. Lawrence, 848 F.2d 1502
Defendant appeals from a final order of the district court ordering
him to modify or remove from his lands a fence which enclosed some
9,600 acres of public lands. Portions of this land provide winter range
for Wyoming pronghorn antelope. The fence, although on private land,
denied the antelope access to their winter range. Defendant argued that
the antelope have been granted an easement across his land or that a
servitude has been imposed upon his land. He further argued that the
imposition of this public servitude on his private property without pay-
ment of compensation is a "taking" within the fifth amendment, for
which he should be compensated. The Tenth Circuit rejected all of the
defendant's arguments and upheld the district court. The court held
that the Unlawful Inclosure of Public Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061 to
1066, was intended to prevent the obstruction of free passage or transit
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for any and all lawful purposes over public lands. One of the lawful
purposes of public lands is to provide food and habitat for fish and
wildlife.
United States v. Trujillo, 853 F.2d 800
Henry Trujillo and Magdalena Duran, the appellants, requested ti-
tle to property, the ownership of which was being contested between
Taos Pueblo and the United States. The Trujillos asserted that their
predecessors in title had made a claim to the land before the Pueblo
Lands Board, which granted most of their claim but denied these partic-
ular parcels. Because their predecessors met the rest of the require-
ments for a patent under the Pueblo Lands Act, appellants believed they
were the rightful owners of the property.
The district court denied these claims because there was insufficient
evidence to show that the claims were made to the land by appellants'
predecessors, and the property was ordered to be restored to the
Pueblo. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision that a patent under the
Pueblo Lands Act must fail if there is a lack of sufficient evidence to
show the Pueblo Lands Board ruled on the contested properties. The
court quieted title to the property in the Taos Pueblo and held the
Trujillos to be innocent trespassers.
United States v. 10,031.98 Acres of Land, 850 F.2d 634
Appeal from an order granting the first new trial and denying a re-
quest for a second new trial. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the order
granting the first new trial and reversed the order denying the second
new trial.
The federal government condemned appellant's property. At the
first trial, the appellant testified as to the value of his property based on
offering prices that he had received on potential replacement ranches in
the general area. Evidence of a mere offer to buy or sell property cannot
be used to show the fair market value of condemned land. The trial
court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in granting the government
a new trial.
At the second trial the court refused to allow the appellant to testify
regarding his opinion of the value of his property based on actual selling
prices of comparable ranch properties. The trial court would not allow
the appellant's opinion testimony without giving details of the individual
sales that he had used for his comparisons. It was improper for the dis-
trict court to prevent the appellant from offering his opinion because the
opinion testimony of a landowner about the value of his or her land is
admissible without further qualification. Denial of appellant's motion
for a new trial after the second trial was, therefore, an abuse of
discretion.
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